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As  has  been  made  abundantly  clear  from  over  thirty  years  of
discussion,  active  experimentation,  and  evaluation  of  federal  farm
programs,  no  easy  panacea  exists  for  the  ails  of commercial  agri-
culture  which  can meet  the  criterion  of mutual  acceptability  to  tax-
payers,  legislators,  commercial  farmers,  and  other politically  active
interest  groups.  Programs  which  bring  income  gains  to  farmers  in
the  marketplace  by  reduced  volume  of  marketings  involve  higher
prices  to  consumers  and  lessened  availability,  as well  as constraints
on production  which many farmers  resent.  Programs  which increase
volume of marketings  and lower prices of food work to the advantage
of  agricultural  input  suppliers,  food  distributors,  and  consumers
while  lowering  net  farm  incomes.  And  programs  such  as  we  have
now  which  adjust  output  and  encourage  participation  by  diversion
payments  and  price  support  payments  improve  farm  net  incomes
at the expense  of the taxpaying  base.
SOME  FEATURES OF THE COMMERCIAL FARM PROBLEM
Most  current  diagnoses  of the  problem  of commercial  agricul-
ture continue  to be  based  on  the notion  of active excess  capacity  in
terms  of  available  dollar  markets  and  a  presumption  that  techno-
logical progress  in agriculture can  continue to outdistance the growth
of domestic  and  effective  export  demand.
The growing Congressional  reluctance to support foreign aid does
not  augur  well  for utilization  of excess  capacity  through  expansion
of  noncommercial  international  trade  in  farm  products.  Further,
many  students  of farm policy  have decided  that efficiency  considera-
tions  alone  would  rule  out  the  kinds  of  "feed  the  world"  notions
which have  found a warm  spot  in  recent  years  in the hearts  of farm
people  with  joint  interests  in  human  welfare  and  expansion  of
opportunity  to  "sell"  (presumably  via  tax  dollars)  U.S.  farm  prod-
ucts to the growing population  abroad.
*This statement is not intended to define my policy position with respect to commercial
agriculture.  Rather  its purpose  is to  promote  discussion of one area of alternatives  to
present-day  policy.
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culture,  too,  now  views  the  future  world  food  balance  (for  1980)
with. much  less  alarm than a few  months ago.
It is well known that  the costs of farm programs  continue at near
record  levels  despite  reduced  surpluses.  Last  year  government  pay-
ments to farmers  amounted  to almost  $3.3  billion,  about  20 percent
of realized  net  income  to agriculture.  This averages just over  $1,000
per  farm.  Payment  rates  reported  for  the  first  five  months  of  this
year  were  12  percent  higher  than  for  the  same  period  a  year  ago.
Realized  net income  to  agriculture  for  the  first  half of  1967  is  esti-
mated  to  be  11  percent  lower  than  the  first  half  of  1966.  If these
estimates  are  representative,  government  payments  for  1967  could
comprise  25  percent  of realized  net  income  to  agriculture.  Direct
payments  by  their  nature  as  payments  for  not producing  probably
irritate  nonfarm  taxpayers  at  least  as  much  as  price  support  losses.
If taxpayers  do  begin  to  develop  a real  sensitivity  to farm  pro-
gram  costs,  pressures  may  mount  for  shifts  in  programs  to  reduce
financial  losses  currently  being  sustained  by  the  government.  It  has
also been  made fairly  clear that mandatory  programs  of government
supply  management  are,  with  minor  exceptions,  not  popular  with
farmers.
Today's  commercial  farm  program  can  be  characterized  as  one
which  features  voluntary  cropland  retirement  for  the  major  crops
in  exchange  for  price  support  direct  payments  and  diversion  pay-
merits,  and  market  clearing  prices.  True,  we  also  have market order
programs,  some  loan-and-storage  price  support  and marketing quota
programs,  and many  other individual programs  for agriculture.  How-
ever, the  main pattern set  by feed grains,  wheat, and cotton programs
fits  my characterization  generally.  My comments  will  apply primarily
to  those  areas  and  will  not  deal  with  the  specifics  of specialty  crops
or  livestock  for  which  unique programs  have  been  established,  such
as wool or tobacco.  Most farm policy alternatives seriously considered
will  not  involve  the  sudden  dissolution  of present  farm  programs.
I  subscribe generally  to the statement  that U.S.  farm  policy  is evolu-
tionary,  not revolutionary.
LAND OR PEOPLE AS THE  POLICY FOCUS
The  focal  points  for  commercial  farm  policy  to  alleviate  the
problem  of  excess  resources  or  surplus  capacity  in  agriculture  are
people, farm  land, or some combination  thereof.  That  is, such policy
is  concerned  with  adjusting  the  amount  of  land  used,  or  adjusting
the  number  of people  in  agriculture,  or  both.  Most  of the U.S.  farm
76program  experience  has  been  in  adjusting  the  use  of land.  Adjust-
ments in numbers  of people  in agriculture  directly  by programs  have
been  minor  although  this  idea  has  received  continuing  attention  in
farm policy  recommendations.  I tend to view  the problem  of the un-
trained,  undertrained,  or  educationally  deprived  citizens  as  a prob-
lem in education and welfare, and not a unique problem of agriculture
to which commercial  agricultural  policy should  be directed.  In short,
people-oriented  policies  pointed  toward  the  improvement  of educa-
tion,  the  acquisition  of job  skills,  awareness  of job  opportunities,
and  facilitative  mobility  to  match  people  with  available  jobs  are
intended  for  all the people,  not  for  those  in  commercial  agriculture
alone.
Having  recognized  and  endorsed  the  importance  and  relevance
of policies  to  adjust  the  human  resource  in  a  broader  context  than
commercial  farm  policy,  I  would  like  to  discuss  as  an  alternative
some ideas-by  now  pretty well worn although  unused-for gradual
modification  of  the  present  land-oriented,  direct  payment  fueled
program of production adjustment and income support for agriculture.
The choice of land  as the input to be adjusted is  not an altogether
happy  one  for  several  reasons.  For  example,  the  well-known  ability
of fertilizers  to substitute  for  land  hardly  requires  comment.  About
one-third  of the increase  in crop production  per acre  in  recent years
is attributed  to increases  in  rates of fertilizer  application.  Land as  an
immobile resource  is  consequently  more  limited  in adaptability  than
other  production  inputs  such  as  capital,  labor,  or  management.
Accumulation  or  capitalization  of program  benefits  in  the value  of
land  as the controlled  resource is well demonstrated  too. Nonetheless,
the  adjustment  potentialities  of land  in the short  run  and  the  inter-
mediate  run  have made  it the  practical  choice  upon which  to focus
adjustment for  agriculture.
THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE IN  AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT
THROUGH  LAND
The  experience  of the  United  States  in  retiring  cropland  from
use  in  the  interest  of achieving  a  supply-demand  balance  has  been
less than  fully  satisfying.  The  early experience  with the  Soil  Conser-
vation  and  Domestic  Allotment Act of the mid-1930's  demonstrated
that adjustment  by rental of cropland acres  could be quite inefficient
in  reducing  output.  The  poorest  cropland  acres  are  selected  and
substitution  of  other  inputs  offset  in  large  part  the land  withdrawn
from  production.  Thus,  under  normal  weather  conditions,  produc-
tion does not  decline nearly  as much  as  acreage withdrawn.
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not  stimulate  interest  in  land  retirement  programs  by  rental.  Total
crop  production  continued  to  rise  after  inauguration  of  the  Soil
Bank  Program  in  1956.  Crop  yields  increased  more  than  enough
to offset the acreages withdrawn.  At its peak the Soil Bank had about
28  million  acres  signed  up,  but harvested  acreage  was  reduced  only
14  million  acreas.  Over  the years  we  have  learned  that  rental  pro-
grams  which  seek  to  retire  whole  farms  rather  than  parts  of farms
offer  more  promise,  as  do  programs  which  retire  marginal  acres,
provided rental payments are set at levels which reflect the differences
in the quality of lands rented.  We also know  that voluntary programs
of  land  retirement  by  rental  have  tended  to  be  more  popular  with
farmers  than mandatory  programs  to retire  land.
PRESENT LAND DIVERSION  PROGRAMS ARE  EXPENSIVE
Retirement  or  diversion  of cropland  is  down  somewhat  from the
near  65  million  acres  of cropland  withdrawn  from  use  in  the early
1960's  but  appears  likely  to continue  in  a modest range  between  40
and  70  million  acres  in  at least  the near future.  While  producers,  in
deciding  whether  to  participate  in  the  diversion  program  or  not,
doubtless  respond  to  the  attractions  of  price  support  payments  as
well  as  diversion  payments,  recent  experience  illustrates  costs  of
diversion  payments.  In  1965,  for  example,  diversion  payment  costs
per  acre  of  corn  diverted  were  $31.71;  for  grain  sorghum  $20.65;
and  for  barley  $12.23.  The  three  feed  grains  averaged  $27.38  in
diversion  payments  per  acre  removed.  Adding  price  support  pay-
ments in  the feed  grains  brings  the payment  total to $39.80  per  acre
for  feed  grains.  Ken  Robinson of Cornell  has  estimated that the cost
of the  1963-64  feed grain  program  was about  equal  to the  value of
production  reduced.  If  we  take  the  price  support  and  certificate
payments  in combination  with  the  diversion payment  for  wheat,  and
impute  average yields  to the lands  diverted,  we find that the cost per
bushel  of output  reduced  in  the  1965  wheat  crop  was  something  in
excess  of $8.00.
The  message  of these  statistics  is  clear.  Retiring  cropland  by  a
voluntary  program  incorporating  diversion  payment  and  direct  pay-
ment price  support incentives  is expensive!
THE TRADITION  OF GOVERNMENT  INVOLVEMENT WITH THE
LAND RESOURCE
The  entire  history  of government  involvement  in  agriculture  in
the United States  has revolved around the land resource  to  an impor-
tant  degree.  Essentially  since  the beginnings  of the United  States  as
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trolling  the  land  resource.  The  first  hundred  years  of  the  nation's
history  were  devoted  to  the  acquisition  of public  domain  and  the
redistribution  of the  land to  its citizens-farmers  for  the most part.
Today the  federal  government  owns one-third  of the total U.S.  land
resources.  In farm policy,  however,  aside from the purchase  of about
12  million  acres  of submarginal  farm  land in  the  1930's,  the  Con-
gress  and the Executive  Branch  have steered  clear of this prospective
device  for  significantly  reducing  the  cost of farm  programs  focused
on  adjustment  of supply  to  demand  at acceptable  price  levies.  As  a
consequence one might say figuratively that the taxpayer has continued
to  buy  milk without  considering  the possibilities  of owning  the  cow,
or  perhaps  more  concretely  the  taxpayer  continues  to  rent  when  it
is cheaper  to own.
THE ALTERNATIVE  OF ADJUSTMENT  BY GOVERNMENT  PURCHASE
OF LAND
The  withdrawal  of cropland  from  use  by  government  purchase
may offer  significant advantages  over  present methods of land retire-
ment and merits consideration  as  an alternative,  if the federal govern-
ment  is  to  continue  to  try  to  balance demand and supply of farm
products at price levels  which  hold promise of favorable incomes
to commercial agriculture.
While  the right  of eminent  domain  makes  government  purchase
of  farmland  in  large  contiguous  blocks  a  technical  possibility,  it
seems unlikely that such a drastic step could be justified unless, indeed,
the  purpose  for  which  the  contiguous  areas  were  needed  was  quite
urgent. A  more likely  acceptable  approach  is the gradual acquisition
of farmland by government purchase  as it becomes  available  through
voluntary  sale  and  settlement  of estates.  Guidelines  for  acquisition
could  be  established,  including  limits  on  maximum  area  density  of
government  farmland  purchases,  acceptable  ranges  in  prices  to  be
paid for land relative to value of crops produced,  and over-all annual
rates  of  land  acquisition  as  well  as  cropping  patterns  and  terrain
characteristics  of  lands  to  be  purchased.  Whole  farm  purchases,
while increasing  the amount of land purchased  to achieve a particular
amount  of cropland  retired, would  have  the advantage  of withdraw-
ing  more  farm  related  resources  from  use.  To  avoid  the  problem
created for  state  and local  governments  by removal of property  from
the  tax  rolls,  the federal  government  would  need  to  make payments
to  state  and  local  governments  in  lieu  of  taxes.  Maintenance  costs
for  farmlands  retired  would  need  to  be  included  also  to  accommo-
date  the  possibility  of return  to  agricultural  use  and  to  protect  the
investment.
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ment  may  vary  somewhat  from year  to year  and  may  be  influenced
by the existence of the program, if it were  enacted.  In the year ending
in  March  1966,  nearly  114,000  farms  with  a  total  of 26.5  million
acres  were  transferred  in  voluntary  sales  or  estate  settlements.  A
conservative  estimate  would  be  that  over  10  million  of these  acres
were  cropland.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  such  a program  would  be
gradual  in operation  and  might have  a target  of ten  to twenty  years
for full withdrawal  of cropland currently  projected  as excess capacity.
Phasing  out  of the  current  cropland  retirement  programs  and  their
payment  incentives  would  be  geared  to the  progress  of government
land  purchase  and  prospective  demand  for  farm  products  relative
to  current  supplies.  Temporary  return  to  use  of  government  lands
acquired in the program  by year-to-year rental  to interested producers
would  be feasible  to meet  weather generated  shortages.
Some  notion  of  savings  can  be  gained  by  comparing  per  acre
outlays  of  land  purchase  versus  the  present  program.  At  current
average land values of $200 per acre, a program to acquire 60 million
acres  would  cost  $12  billion,  and  the  annual  interest  charge  at  5
percent  would be $600 million.  Maintenance  and payments  in lieu of
taxes  at  $3 per  acre  would  add  $180 million for  a total  annual  cost
of $780 million.  This  is less than one-third of the diversion  and price
support payments  for wheat,  feed grains,  and cotton for the first nine
months  of fiscal  1967.  Furthermore,  the  gains  in  land  value  to  be
realized  upon ultimate  return to private ownership  of lands purchased
by the  government  would  offset  a significant  share  of the cost,  if the
present  land  value  trend  continues.  The  increase  in  farmland  values
has averaged  about 5 percent per year over the last fifteen years.
The  preference  for  a  program  of  government  land  purchase
rather than the  purchase of crop limiting easements,  which  has been
suggested by some, is based primarily on economy. Estimates obtained
in  a Nebraska  study  by  Griffing  and  Fischer  suggest  that  easement
costs would  range  from 67 percent  to  97 percent  of the owner's  esti-
mated  value  of the  property.  Resale  at  some  future  date by  govern-
ment  would  be  more  difficult  due  to  the  limited  market,  and  the
recovery  rate on investment  is less firmly attached  to the land market.
In the present environment  of a Congress generous in its financial
treatment  of agriculture,  a  move  in  the  direction  of land  retirement
by purchase seems fairly  unlikely. A significant shift toward reduction
in  federal  spending  for  agriculture,  however,  and  the  continuation
of present  income  objectives  of commercial  agriculture  may lead  to
consideration  of such  a plan.
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of cropland  retirement  include  its  voluntary  nature,  its  consistency
with  historic  patterns  of  government  involvement  with  the  land
resource,  its  flexibility  to  accommodate  changed  needs  via  leasing
into agricultural  use  to meet  temporary  shortages,  its adaptability  to
accommodate  nonfarm  uses  for  contiguous  acreage,  and  finally  its
prospects  of sharply  lowered  taxpayer costs  for retiring  cropland.
POLICY  MODIFICATIONS  TO  MEET  POSSIBLE  CHANGES
IN  AGRICULTURE'S  COMPETITIVE  STANCE
Any  extended  comment  on  policy  for  commercial  agriculture
calls  for  some  attention to  those  aspects  of farm  policy which  focus
on  the  marketplace  and  the  competitive  aspects  of  agriculture  in
relation to the rest of the economy.  Marketing  orders and  price  sup-
ports  have  been  in limited  use  for  many  years  for some  parts of the
product  complex  of  agriculture  as  devices  to  work  in  part  toward
balancing  bargaining  power  between  farmers  and  other  interests
(while  improving  farm  prices).  These  devices  have  been  used  in
addition to the land retirement efforts to balance  supply and demand.
Also,  since  the  1920's  farmers  banding  together  in  cooperatives
have  been  protected  by  special  provisions  of law  from  prosecution
for  activities  in  restraint  of  trade.  And  more  recently  some  farm
wage  workers  have  been  brought  under  the  minimum  hourly  wage
provisions  of the Fair Labor Standards  Act.
It  seems  likely  that  continuation  of  present  trends  in  size  and
number  of  farms  and  advancing  technology  will  bring  changes  in
farmers'  market  behavior  patterns  which  call  for  reassessment  of
government's  role in  this  sphere  of activity.
If the trends  of absolute change  in U.S.  farm  numbers  of the last
eight  years  were  to  continue,  the  growth  in  number  of farms  with
sales  over  $20,000  would  meet  the  decline  in  over-all  number  of
farms in  about twenty years,  and no smaller farms  would exist.  While
we realize  that this is  unlikely  to occur,  it does  suggest that in longer
range  policy  for  commercial  agriculture  important  recognition  will
need  to  be  given  to  bargaining  power  aspects  of  sharply  reduced
numbers  of  farms  which  are  primarily  large,  highly  specialized,
single  enterprise  (or single  end  product)  units.  Many  of these  farms
in  twenty  years  may  be  approaching-or  will  have  passed-the
threshold  of farm  firm decision  making which  begins to take account
of the  effects  of volume  of production  and  sales  of the  individual
unit  on  market price  of its product.  Recent  developments  in farmer
bargaining  point  to  the  interest  of  farm  people  in  self-generated
effort to achieve income  objectives  by bargaining  rather than govern-
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begin  to  develop  over  the  next  several  years  with  general  farm  or
farm commodity  organizations  making continued  attempts  to bargain
with  processors  for favorable  terms  of sale  contracts  extending  over
significant  ranges  of  time.  Experimentation  may  also  include  the
efforts  of  farm  wage  workers  to  organize  and  bargain  with  farm
operators  in  areas  of greatest  susceptibility  to enforce  wage  demands
and  to obtain continuing contracts.
If hints of  the  development  of bargaining  strength  in  agriculture
are  indeed  forerunners  of more  elaborate  and  effective  use  of  agri-
cultural bargaining  power, it appears  that policy needs for this aspect
of commercial  agriculture will move away from direct government in-
tervention in the form of market price guarantees or marketing orders.
The notable  lack  of farmer response  to the proposal  of the National
Commission  on Food  Marketing  last year  for the creation  of federal
agricultural  marketing  boards with  broad powers to interpose  a gov-
ernment  sponsored  structure  to  bargain  and  regulate  marketings  on
the  producers'  behalf  is  significant.  Government's  role  in  this  area
of activity  seems  much  more  likely  to  become  that of referee in  the
ensuing  conflicts  of  interest  between  agricultural  input  suppliers,
farm  operators,  processors,  and  consumers  in  the  production,
processing,  and  marketing  of food  and  fiber.  Early  establishment  of
rules to  be applied  in such  conflicts,  recognizing  both the  precedents
of existing  regulatory  legislation  concerning  competition  and  labor-
management relations and the peculiarities of farming as  an economic
activity,  would seem  to be  a timely  first step.
SUMMARY
For reasons  of brevity  at least,  this  statement has  not attempted
to  deal  with  many  of the  policy issues  affecting  commercial  agricul-
ture.  For  example,  the  entire  question  of appropriate  target  pricing
level  or  levels  for  farm  products  and  its  implications  for  domestic
and  international  agricultural  markets  has  received  no  direct  com-
ment.  Similarly,  goals  for  commercial  agriculture  in  terms  of  level
of net  income  or  returns  to  resources  of  farm  families  versus  non-
farm  families  has  not  been  mentioned.  Rather  this  statement  has
tried to focus  briefly  on  the potentials  and limitations  of agricultural
production  adjustment  via  land diversion  or retirement,  some of the
public  cost  reducing  possibilities  (and  limitations)  of  government
land  purchase,  and  the  emerging  role  of  government  in  the  more
active  bargaining  struggle  of farm  operators,  farm  labor,  and  those
with  whom the farm  business  deals  as  well as  those  it  serves.  Despite
these limitations  it  may be that the areas of concern  of this statement
carry implications for some  of the omitted issues as well.
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